



THE JOINT STAFF

The Trident Conference: May 1943

The principal participants at the Trident Conference—which was held in Washington, DC, from May 12 to 25, 1943—were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston S. Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). British Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell; Major General Claire L. Chennault, USA; and Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, USA, from the China-Burma-India Theater were also present for the discussions on this region, marking the first time when Allied commanders from Asia attended a major wartime conference.

Building on the decision at the Casablanca Conference to knock Italy out of the war first, the planning for the Italian campaign, which would begin with the amphibious invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky), was a major focus at the Trident Conference. The Allied leaders also deliberated on how and when to stage the cross-Channel invasion of France to bring the war with Germany to an end. Other notable topics of discussion at Trident included increasing air attacks on Axis targets—with an emphasis on bombing the oil fields in Ploiesti, Romania—and recapturing Burma from Japanese forces and reopening the supply lines to China.

Trident was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British leaders in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus,

they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II.

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public.

In addition to Trident, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and PDF formats:

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF)

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
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ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2
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093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF)

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David B. Crist". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looped initial "D".

David B. Crist, PhD
Director for Joint History

TRIDENT CONFERENCE

MAY 1943

PAPERS
AND
MINUTES OF MEETINGS

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1943

C.C.S. 234

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Elimination of Italy First)

References:

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (4)
CCS 87th Meeting, Item (5)
CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3)
5th White House Meeting

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject paper prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S. Planners was circulated 17 May 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 234 together with a U. S. paper, prepared in consultation with the British Planners, (C.C.S. 235) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1) and which were also included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 234

17 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Elimination of Italy First)
(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg.,
Item 4 a (2))

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany, showing the course of operations and their feasibility accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

BRITISH PLAN FOR
THE DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

OBJECT

The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

SECTION I - INVASION OF N.W. EUROPE

1. A necessary prerequisite to a re-entry on the Continent across the Channel is the initial softening of German war potential by the intensified combined bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Since this re-entry will ultimately be necessary, no plan for the defeat of Germany can be drawn up without first examining the essential features of the operation.

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2. The essentials for invasion are as follows:-

a. A high degree of air superiority must be achieved during the assault and build-up.

b. Air fields must be captured at an early date.

c. The Coast defences must be sufficiently reduced by the employment of all available means, both before and during the assault.

d. The initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale and our rate of build-up must compete with that of the enemy.

e. The beach capacity must be sufficient to allow of the subsequent maintenance of the force landed in the first seven days. Sufficient ports must be captured and available for use early.

f. Weather conditions must be suitable.

3. There are two main factors in this problem. These are:-

a. The size of force which can be employed in the assault, which in general is limited by the assault shipping and landing craft available.

b. The relative rate of build-up of our own force, compared to that of the enemy, which can be achieved after the initial assault.

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS

4. Any assault is likely to meet not less than three divisions in the coastal zone reinforced by up to four divisions after 24 hours. The scale of assault cannot therefore be less than 10 divisions.

The assault shipping and landing craft required for an operation involving a force of this nature, run into large figures owing to the necessity for seven of these divisions being afloat simultaneously.

The scale of craft has been worked out in great detail by the British Planners in conjunction with the *ROUNDUP* Combined Planners. The number of craft required to cross the Channel is higher than in other parts of the world on account of the need for a quicker rate of build-up and of the higher degree of resistance expected.

5. Of the total force of 10 Divisions, the British can provide 2 assault and 3 *immediate* follow-up divisions provided that the Americans allot the following assault shipping and craft:-

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L.S.T.2	122)	
L.S.E.	6)	All required in
L.C.I.(I)	140)	
L.C.T.5 or 6	125)	U.K. by 1st
L.C.M.3	280)	
Certain maintenance)		February, 1944.
equipment)		

The above figures are based on the assumption that operations after *HUSKY* will take place in the Mediterranean, resulting in additional casualties to landing craft and ships.

6. The American contribution in the assault will amount to two assault divisions and three follow-up divisions. The two assault divisions which must be assault trained before arrival in U.K. must be carried in American assault shipping and American manned craft. The three follow-up divisions will be carried in the first turn-round of the ships and craft employed in the British and American assaults.

7. We understand that it is very doubtful if the total requirements could be found by 1 February 1944 - to permit an assault date of 1 April 1944. This would mean either a reduction in the scale of the assault or a rate of build-up too slow to be acceptable.

RATE OF BUILD-UP FOR INVASION

8. The most favourable area for build-up is that of the North Seine ports - Dieppe to Rouen, in which we estimate that there would be by D plus 7 ten Divisions ashore. Allowing for the build-up of reserves and for ports being put into working order, we estimate that by D plus 90 - twenty Divisions would be ashore, and by D plus 125 - twenty-five Divisions would be ashore. Thereafter additional ports would have to be used for the maintenance of a force of more than twenty-five Divisions.

9. The maximum maintenance capacity of the ports in the Cotentin peninsula is ten Divisions by D plus 90. Any build-up in this area can only be accomplished if additional ports outside the peninsula are captured.

ENEMY STRENGTH

10. The *estimated* German strength in France and the Low Countries in 1944 is 35 Divisions, of which at least four would be available as a mobile reserve. In addition there are some 100,000 static internal security defence troops. Reinforcing divisions would have to come from Germany or the Eastern Front. Up to ten under-strength divisions might conceivably be available in Germany, but would almost certainly not be available if Turkey were already in the war. Advance units of these might arrive four days after the decision to reinforce and might arrive thereafter in France (but not necessarily in the threatened area) at the rate of six divisions a week. The arrival of reinforcements from Russia must depend on the situation on that front. None could in any case arrive in less than 14 days, after which any available could come at the rate of 2 divisions a week. The defection of Italy would, however, have already reduced the German strength in Russia. Assuming, therefore, that the initial assault is faced by four divisions, our forces would, in the worst case, be faced by eighteen German divisions within the first fortnight, after which mobile reinforcements could only come at the expense of the Russian Front.

11. These rates of reinforcement might be considerably reduced by successful Allied air action, but the extent of this reduction would depend on a number of factors and cannot be assessed until the outline plan is firm.

12. Over and above the fixed defences the *minimum* Axis garrison which might be in France and the Low Countries, short of a complete withdrawal, is estimated at twenty-two divisions of which three would be in mobile reserve.

13. It is clear that unless Russian action or Allied action elsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France from the figures in paragraph 10 to something approaching those given in paragraph 12, we are unlikely to be able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of build-up gives us superiority over the enemy.

14. Another most important factor, though it cannot be defined as one that is limiting, is the achievement of a high degree of air

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superiority during the assault and build-up. The Combined Intelligence Staffs have agreed:-

a. If the exploitation of *HUSKY* is abandoned, the opposition to cross-Channel operations at 1 May 1944 will be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by some 10 squadrons, say 100 planes. Within a week 50 additional squadrons, 450 planes, would be concentrated in the area, giving a total, without losses, of 165 squadrons or 1,485 planes. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany's will to strip the Russian Front.

b. If Italy is out of the war the early opposition to cross-Channel operations will also be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes. *But the enemy's ability to reinforce this force, will be negligible unless he is prepared to strip the Russian Front.*

DEDUCTIONS

15. To ignore the limitations of a cross-Channel operation outlined above would be to invite the danger of entering on a build-up race in which we could probably never obtain the necessary margin of superiority for success. If, however, the German strength in France can be reduced to the required extent - and we feel confident that it can - without too serious an effect on the availability of our forces in the U.K., successful invasion should be possible with the forces outlined above in the spring or summer of 1944.

16. The Mediterranean commitment which would result from a collapse of Italy would cause a reduction from some 1,480 to 950 aircraft in the potential ability of Germany to resist our cross-Channel operations. Only some unknown and incalculable weakness on the part of Russia could ease this situation for Germany.

METHOD OF DEFEATING GERMANY

17. After *HUSKY* we must intensify, with every means at our disposal, the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a successful invasion across the Channel in 1944. To the effect of the intensified bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian war, we must therefore add continued pressure by our combined forces further

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to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases from which to hit him.

POTENTIALITIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

18. We have in the Mediterranean powerful and seasoned forces, whose attack is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have reaped the great advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. Not to do so would be to cast away an unrivalled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal injury and, instead, to give her a chance to parry the final blow and delay her defeat for at least another year.

19. This final blow can only be struck across the Channel; it cannot be delivered from the Mediterranean - but the peculiar nature of the cross-Channel operation sets limits to the weight of this blow.

We therefore strongly hold the belief that to make this blow possible every opportunity must be taken between now and its delivery to exhaust and weaken Germany.

DECEPTION

20. Moreover, apart from weakening the Germans, it is an essential part of this preparation to deceive them as to our intentions. To discontinue operations in the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces in the United Kingdom in a series of moves which could not be concealed, would be to invite them to take appropriate measures to meet what would become an obvious threat.

IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

21. After a successful *HUSKY* the greatest aid we could give to Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done to Germany, would be to tear Italy from the Axis.

22. Seven Italian divisions in France and Corsica, and 32 in the Balkans and the Aegean would lay down their arms and Germany would have to find at least fifteen divisions to replace them or so weaken her hold on the Balkans that she would be in danger of losing control in this vital area - a prospect which she could not tolerate. The loss of some 1,400 Italian aircraft, and the approach of the war towards the

southern boundaries of the Reich would cost the extended Luftwaffe at least 450 fighters, half of which would have to be found by improvisation. The enemy's total air commitments would reduce his ability to reinforce the Western Front to negligible proportions unless he were prepared to strip the Russian Front. The Italian fleet, though admittedly no great menace, contains valuable British heavy units which would be immediately released to engage the Japanese.

23. Apart, therefore, from the moral and political effects of the collapse of Italy, this calamity would immediately prove for Germany a military disaster of the first magnitude.

SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS

24. In the West, the occupation of key points in Sardinia and the restoration of Corsica to France would create a threat to southern France which the Germans could not ignore. The Germans would either have to occupy and fight for northern Italy, which they might well be unable to do, or yield air bases which could place 500 bombers within range of a large number of important German targets - notably aircraft factories and oil plants - which cannot be attacked from England, North Africa or Sicily. The *safe areas* to which the population of western Germany are being evacuated would come under constant threat of air attack, with serious effect on morale. The German air defences would be split and the effectiveness of the air offensive greatly increased. Moreover, the threat of invasion to southern France would be increased, together with the potentialities of diversionary action to coincide with our invasion across the Channel.

25. In Russia the German forces on land and in the air would have to be reduced below the strength that was already inadequate during the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43.

26. In the East, the Germans would have great difficulty in controlling the Balkans. Sustained at comparatively little cost to the Allies, and supported by air action, up to 300,000 guerillas could harass the enemy's vulnerable communications, denying him important economic resources in Yugoslavia and Greece, facing him with seriously

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increasing recalcitrance and throttling his garrisons in Greece to such an extent that it is difficult to see how they could be maintained.

27. Added to this, Ploesti itself would, for the first time, be brought within range of effective air attack, from Italy; great - possibly vital - damage could be done, and the German air defence commitments would once more be increased. The Roumanians are, moreover, unlikely to show much firmness under air bombardment and only a small proportion of the 38,000 operatives are thought to be Germans.

28. In the Aegean, the Dodecanese would be weakened and might well be taken, and the way opened for Turkey to enter the lists. This event would be a further heavy blow. Its political effect would be immense, Ploesti would be threatened, together with the eastern Balkan and Black Sea communications, and Germany would be faced with a land front in Thrace which she could only attack if she were to find 7 to 8 more divisions and allot proportionate air squadrons from her already attenuated air forces. We are committed to support Turkey if she is attacked with 48 squadrons and two armoured divisions. These forces must, therefore, be held ready in the Mediterranean against this possibility.

DEDUCTION

29. Collectively, all these strategic prizes might even be decisive. This policy, together with the effects of the Eastern Front and the weighty air offensive, is bound to produce powerful results. The results in our opinion will create a situation which will make the difference between success or failure of a re-entry into northwest Europe in 1944.

SECTION II - SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY

30. The Tunisian disaster has been a severe shock to the Italians. While *HUSKY* is being mounted, southern Italy will be bombed, and virtually blockaded at sea. Success in *HUSKY* will be a further blow to Italian morale. Whether Italy will collapse at once will depend to a

great extent on the degree of support which she receives from Germany and on events on the Eastern Front.

31. If *HUSKY* does not bring about a collapse, Italy can be subjected to a heavy scale of air attack. From August onwards, the bomber force from the United Kingdom could develop a scale of attack on the industrial areas concentrated in the North which would create conditions in which the supply and maintenance of the Italian armed forces would become precarious. Concurrently an even heavier attack could be directed from North Africa and Sicily against the South. The combined effects of these attacks might well bring about the collapse of Italy.

32. It is, however, so important to knock Italy out quickly that we cannot rely on air attack alone. We, therefore, consider that limited combined operations should be developed to support the air offensive, maintain the momentum of the onslaught and tip the scales in our favor, as this can be done at reasonable cost and with the resources present on the spot.

33. In the Central Mediterranean, we have the choice of two lines of advance, one northeastwards into the Toe and Heel of Italy to threaten, if necessary, the Rome-Naples area, the other northwestwards to Sardinia and Corsica. An Aegean advance by the Dodecanese would not have an immediate or speedy effect on the collapse of Italy. Operations against the Mainland are more continuous than an attack on Sardinia and are more likely to collapse Italy this autumn. The capture of Sardinia would cost the equivalent of seven divisions. The capture of the Heel of Italy would involve a total of nine divisions. In either case we should employ the bulk of our resources in present Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. The selection of the course to be pursued must await *HUSKY* and will turn on such factors as the general air and land situation at the time; German reinforcement; if any, of the objectives; and the morale of the Army and people of Italy.

34. We feel that either of these operations following rapidly upon a successful *HUSKY* and in conditions of rising air bombardment would tip the scale in our favor.

SITUATION AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

35. The general war weariness and dissatisfaction of all sections of the Italian people will dispose them towards dealing with the Allies. Owing to the heavy commitment imposed by an Italian default, Germany will be forced to cut her unessential commitments and dispose her available forces so as to hold the areas which she considers essential to her security. These are, we consider: -

a. The Maritime Alps between France and Italy which she will hold with some two or three divisions.

b. The area east of the River Adige towards the Yugoslav frontier held with some two or three divisions.

36. The fear of air attack on south Germany from airdromes in the Milan and Turin areas, might force the enemy to fight a delaying action on the line Ravenna-Pisa. In this case five low category divisions would be required for internal security in north Italy, twelve divisions for a determined stand on the line Ravenna-Pisa or four divisions for a token stand to delay our progress northward. The provision of these forces would leave the Balkans disastrously weak.

OPERATIONS AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

37. After an Italian collapse we must take full advantage of the situation, to give the maximum further aid to Russia and to facilitate cross-Channel operations in 1944.

38. During the period of confusion we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo. This would cost four assault brigades and two infantry divisions with one mixed division in reserve in Italy, and might be accomplished with little opposition. We should thus put in a total force of three divisions. This force would activate the guerillas, and we could support it with up to 500 bombers and 300 transport aircraft from the mainland.

39. On an Italian collapse, we should forestall the Germans in the Dodecanese and bring pressure on Turkey to enter the war, and so make available to us the benefits we have already noted, and in particular the use of air bases from which to bomb Ploesti.

40. Should the Germans decide to remain on the Ravenna-Pisa line, three divisions would be required in the Rome-Naples area to stop German infiltration to the southward. An enemy withdrawal from the Milan-Turin area would leave the air fields open to occupation by us, if we wished to do so. A force of six divisions would be required to secure the air fields against an estimated scale of German attack of 4 - 6 divisions, but only minor forces would then be required in the Rome-Naples area.

GARRISON COMMITMENTS

41. We should occupy the Cagliari and Alghero areas of Sardinia and Corsica and occupy, or remain in occupation of, the Trapani, Messina and possibly the Catania areas of Sicily. This commitment would amount to about 15 battalions and 3 brigades.

SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS

42. Our proposals for meeting these commitments and our commitments in North Africa are detailed in Appendix "A". After they have been met, we estimate that we shall have available in reserve, or for further operations such as an attack on the south of France:-

5 American Divisions
4 - 7 British Divisions
1 French Division

In any event our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions.

43. The economic commitment which may have to be shouldered is described in C.C.S. 227. This problem will have to be faced in the event of an Italian collapse, whether or not we carry out any further operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*.

SECTION III - EFFECT OF MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY
ON THE BUILD-UP OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

ASSAULT SHIPS AND CRAFT

44. Allowing for casualties at the agreed rate, any of the above courses of action can be carried out with the assault shipping and

landing craft (British and American combined) allocated to the Mediterranean Theatre for *HUSKY*, together with one or two minor reinforcements of certain specialized British types.

45. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to *HUSKY* would only reduce the amount of assault shipping and landing craft for cross-Channel operations in 1944, by the equivalent of 10% of the total personnel and 6% of the total number of vehicles to be landed. The reduction in personnel lift is not serious as the numbers could be ferried from ship to shore.

Thus, in terms of assault shipping and craft, it is evident that the continuance of Mediterranean operations after *HUSKY* has comparatively little effect on cross-Channel operations in 1944.

BOLERO BUILD-UP

46. After allowing for a *SICKLE* movement of 380,000 men as well as for the necessary R.N., R.A.F. and Canadian troop movements by 1st April, 1944, the number of U.S. divisions which will be in the U.K. by this date will be:

- a. Assuming no further Mediterranean operation after
HUSKY - 20
- b. Assuming a continuance of Mediterranean operation
after *HUSKY* - 14-1/2

Of the above divisions under *a*, two will be in process of disembarkation and two will be linking up with their equipment; but under *b*, owing to the slower rate of movement to the United Kingdom, only one will be in process of disembarkation and one linking up with its equipment. The total number of U.S. divisions which will, therefore, be available for operations from the U.K. on 1st April 1944, under the two above hypotheses will be:

- a. 16 divisions
- b. 12-1/2 divisions

47. In this connection, the two examinations of the cargo shipping position just completed by the British and United States Committees on Shipping Availability reveal an apparent deficiency against total requirements, other than post-*HUSKY*, of 336 sailings for the rest of the year.

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Losses have so far been less than the agreed rate taken as the basis of the calculations. In view of this and the economies that could be effected by the Combined Loading of British imports and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, this deficiency may be largely eliminated and all calculations in the above paragraph are based on the realization of this hope. It may even happen that the reduction in the programmed *BOLERO* movement shown above due to the additional requirement of some 90 ships for post-*HUSKY* operations, may not be fully necessary.

BRITISH FORCES AVAILABLE IN THE U.K

48. The British forces available in the U.K. for cross-Channel operations by 1st April 1944 amount to 10-14 divisions dependent on whether cannibalization proves necessary or not.

RETURN OF LAND FORCES FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN

49. The size of the cross-Channel assault, as we have already shown, is limited by the number of landing craft that will be available. It would be possible to bring two additional British divisions ex North Africa to U.K. in the first quarter of 1944 without materially affecting the *BOLERO* program as planned for that quarter.

50. It will be seen from Appendix "A" that after the elimination of Italy there will be some ten divisions (British and American) in the Mediterranean available for other employment. Even if we halted in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, there will be no object in bringing these forces back to U.K. except that they are battle experienced troops, since the availability of landing craft and maintenance limitations will preclude their use in *ROUNDUP*.

DEDUCTION

51 Thus, if we continue operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, there can be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April 1944 for cross-Channel operations some 22 1/2 - 26 1/2 divisions, United States and British. These figures could be increased by a further two divisions if it is decided to bring two British divisions back from North Africa (see paragraph 49 above). Even if no post-*HUSKY* operations are carried out, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom would only be increased by 3 1/2.

AIR FORCES

52. There are sufficient air forces in the Mediterranean to implement the strategy recommended. Allowing for the bombing of Italy and necessary air striking forces, defensive fighter commitments and air forces for Turkey, we could possibly return to United Kingdom, if offensive amphibious operations in the Mediterranean stopped after *HUSKY*, up to the following strength of air forces:

<u>Type</u>	<u>U.S.</u>		<u>British</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>
Fighter	16	400	9	144	25	544
Fighter/Recce	2	36	2	32	4	68
Light Bomber	12	156	5	80	17	236
P.R.U.	1	13	2	24	3	37
Transport	20	250	-	--	20	258

53. It is at present impossible to say to what extent this would actually increase the air forces available in U.K. in April, 1944, since only a proportion of these units could actually be reconstituted in the line. Additional strength would, however, be given to existing formations by additional reserves of aircraft and personnel.

54. If amphibious operations were continued in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, the air forces stated in paragraph 52 would have to remain until offensive operations were concluded. There should then still be time to bring back a proportion before April, 1944, but there would be no fighter squadrons to spare, and extra transport aircraft would have to be retained. The retention of fighter squadrons in the Mediterranean would, in addition to the considerations stated in paragraph 53, probably not have a restricting effect on fighter reserves for cross-Channel operations.

SECTION IV - CONCLUSIONS

55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of *HUSKY* solely upon *ROUNDUP* is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, to adopt a defensive attitude on land and to allow Germany to concentrate for the defense of France and the Low Countries against our invasion.

56. Our plan for the defeat of Germany is therefore:

a. To eliminate Italy by:

(1) Air action and one of the following alternatives:

Either

(2) During or immediately after *HUSKY*, a landing in the *REGGIO* area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible on the mainland by landing first at *COTRONE* and then in the *HEEL*.

We estimate that the approximate timings of those operations might be mid-August, 1st September, and mid-October.

Or

(3) During or immediately after *HUSKY* a landing in the *REGGIO* area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible by a landing in *SARDINIA* followed by one in *CORSICA*.

We estimate that the approximate timing of these operations might be mid-August, mid-October, and mid-November, respectively.

b. To invade northwest Europe with the target date of April 1944.

/s/ C. E. LAMBE

/s/ W. PORTER

/s/ W. ELLIOT

Washington, D. C.

17th May 1943

APPENDIX "A"

COMMITMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF ITALY

1. At the conclusion of a successful *HUSKY*, there will be the following forces in the Mediterranean:-

U.S.	-	9 divisions
British	-	25 divisions
French	-	<u>4 divisions</u>
Total		38 divisions

On the assumption that a deduction of 10 percent over all should be made to cover casualties in further operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, this total would be reduced to 35 divisions, made up as follows:-

C.C.S. 235

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U. K.)

References:

- CCS 85th Meeting, Item (4)
- CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3)
- 4th White House Meeting, Item (3)
- 5th White House Meeting

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject paper prepared by the U. S. Planners in consultation with the British Planners was circulated 18 May 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 235 together with a British paper, prepared in consultation with the U. S. Planners (C.C.S. 234) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1), and which are also included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 235

18 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U.K.)

Previous reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., Item 4 a (1)

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners, prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany showing the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible invasion force in the U. K. as soon as possible.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

PROBLEM

1. To present a plan for the defeat of *GERMANY* (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the *UNITED KINGDOM* as soon as possible.

ASSUMPTIONS, 1943-44

2. a. *RUSSIA* remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing the bulk of the German forces. She is at peace with *JAPAN*.

b. No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area subsequent to *HUSKY*.

c. *HUSKY* starts on the date at present planned and all organized opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August.

- d. *SICKLE* continues at full scale as planned.
- e. Air operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be limited to the protection of shipping and the bombing of *ITALY* and other remunerative *AXIS* targets.
- f. *SPAIN* remains neutral.
- g. *TURKEY* is either neutral or an active Ally.

OBJECTIVE

3. The decisive defeat of the *AXIS* Powers in *EUROPE* as early as practicable.

GENERAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN AREA, 1943-44

4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action outlined below are essential:

- a. *SICKLE*, and the bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*.
- b. *BOLERO*, in order to achieve the primary objective, *ROUNDUP*, in the spring of 1944.
- c. Keep *RUSSIA* in the war.
- d. *MEDITERRANEAN* air operations after *HUSKY* must not prejudice *SICKLE*, the bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of *GERMANY* at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-*MEDITERRANEAN* area in 1943-44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an assessment, and accepts the following premises:

- a. Defeat of the Western *AXIS* by means of an invasion from the *MEDITERRANEAN* is unsound strategically and logistically.
- b. The *UNITED KINGDOM* is an unparalleled base from which to create conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch the decisive invasion of the Fortress of *EUROPE*.
- c. *GERMANY* intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943. Only a major threat from another direction will divert *GERMANY* from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the *UNITED NATIONS*. The minor operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* which could be

conducted after *HUSKY*, within the limited capabilities of the *UNITED NATIONS*, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of *ITALY*, would be of lesser importance to *GERMANY* than the defeat of *RUSSIA*. The *UNITED STATES* and British forces are incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with *AXIS* operations against *RUSSIA* in 1943. *GERMANY* will either fail or succeed in *RUSSIA* this summer.

d. We believe that *RUSSIA* will continue to require the major part of the *AXIS* effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the *AXIS* by the Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, *AFRICA*, and *SICILY*, will create a situation favorable for *ROUNDUP* in April 1944.

e. We further believe: that the elimination of *ITALY* is not a prerequisite for the creation of conditions favorable for *ROUNDUP*; that the elimination of *ITALY* may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, by a successful *HUSKY* and an intensified bomber offensive against *ITALY*--in fact Italian defection might precede *HUSKY*; that if, after *HUSKY*, *ITALY* has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantages to be gained in eliminating *ITALY* by conducting further amphibious operations are not worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time; that secondary operations after *HUSKY* to eliminate *ITALY* will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping amphibious equipment, and time on our main effort--*SICKLE*, the bomber offensive, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

f. Experience in *TORCH* and in preparation for *HUSKY* has shown that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case with secondary operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* after *HUSKY*, especially if directed against *ITALY*. The additional forces can only be provided at the direct expense of *SICKLE*, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1944
(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943)

GENERAL

6. GERMANY will be increasingly war weary and will be faced with an economy inadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, among other things, in the armed forces beginning to experience shortages in supply. The presence of RUSSIA on the East and the Allied threat on the West will prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately static, but they will be under strength. Our build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a second front. While this build-up is being effected, the bomber offensive will be carrying the striking power of the UNITED NATIONS to the Germans and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion.

GROUND FORCES

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces may be estimated at about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows:

Eastern Front (including FINLAND)	195
NORWAY	11
POLAND	2
DENMARK	2
Southeastern EUROPE	11
FRANCE and Low Countries	32 (1/3 re- fitting)
GERMANY (Strategic reserve)	27 (1/3 re- fitting)

8. An attack against the European coast would be met by coastal divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2 - 3 to 3 - 5. The mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could begin to arrive after 24 hours, but the movement of these divisions can reasonably be expected to be delayed by aerial action.

9. The strategic reserve in GERMANY will total a maximum of 18 under-strength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total could be in FRANCE, but not in the areas of operations, in 3-1/2 weeks.

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If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would require 5 weeks to complete the move to *FRANCE*. If units could be spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness.

AIR FORCES

10. The number of airplanes is difficult to determine, but after planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas.

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat airplanes in *FRANCE* and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, assuming no losses. Further reinforcements would depend on *GERMANY'S* will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number of German planes is of relatively minor importance due to the *UNITED NATIONS'* preponderance (8 to 1) of air power, in the *UNITED KINGDOM*.

NAVAL FORCES

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E-boats, 17 destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of submarines.

SUMMARY

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in *GERMANY* could be moved to *FRANCE*. Additional time would be required to move them to the combat zone.

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile reserves in *FRANCE* as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in *GERMANY*. Therefore, 3 to 4 coastal divisions must be defeated initially

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and a build-up effected to face a reinforcement of 2 to 4 divisions which may arrive in a depleted and disorganized condition, as a result of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, *GERMANY* might be in a position to face us with a maximum of 15 - 20 understrength divisions. At this time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip other areas including the Russian Front.

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

TARGET DATE

15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the completion of the 4th phase of the Allied bomber offensive against *GERMANY*, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel operation, it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on which we must be prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued examination of the results of the bomber offensive and the integration of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian Front and in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, will enable the *UNITED NATIONS* to decide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should be necessary.

GENERAL CONCEPT

16. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations has been directed to study and prepare plans for invasion at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is proceeding, but has not yet progressed to a full study of *ROUNDUP*. Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the broader aspects of a plan can be presented. Detailed examination may therefore result in some modifications to the plan presented herewith.

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to secure a lodgment in the north of *FRANCE*. It is estimated that ten divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and that sufficient amphibious assault craft will be available to float those required in the initial assault provided those now in the *MEDITERRANEAN* are moved to the *UNITED KINGDOM* on the completion of *HUSKY*, and that no other major amphibious operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* are undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces be accomplished at the

maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with an exploitation of the lodgment to secure additional ports and air bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effects of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, the advance to the heart of the German citadel can be accomplished.

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES

AIR FORCES

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be accomplished.

	U.S.A.A.F.		R.A.F.	
	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Aircraft (U.E.)</u>	<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft (U.E.)</u>
Heavy Bombers	51	2448	80	1600
Medium Bombers	9	576	12	240-
Light and Dive Bombers	13	832	13	260
Bomber Recon.			1	14
Day Fighter	25	2500	62	1116
Night Fighter			19	412
Fighter Recon.			15	231
Army Support (Fighters)			8	112
Army Support (Bombers)			4	56
Photo Recon.	2	168	5	100
Observation	4	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170
Transport	8½	442	7	190
	<u>112½</u>	<u>7302</u>	<u>244½</u>	<u>4661</u>

GROUND FORCES

19. If commitments to other theaters remain at the 1943 level there will be available in the *UNITED STATES*, through 1944, more divisions than can be shipped to the *UNITED KINGDOM*. After *HUSKY*, 6 additional U. S. divisions in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be available for use elsewhere.

20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions by 1 April 1944. After *HUSKY*, 11 additional British divisions in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be available for use elsewhere.

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

21. The build-up in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for a cross-Channel operation can be obtained by the movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* only, or by moving troops from the *UNITED STATES* and transferring surplus U. S. and British formations from *NORTH AFRICA*. The two methods of build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the numbers that can be processed through U. K. ports rather than on a larger number which can actually be moved by available shipping.

BUILD-UP (DIVS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES ONLY (SEE APPENDIX "A")

	1 Oct <u>1943</u>	1 Jan <u>1944</u>	1 Apr <u>1944</u>	1 Jul <u>1944</u>	1 Oct <u>1944</u>	1 Jan <u>1945</u>
U. S.	7	13	20	25	28	31
British	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14*</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	17	23	34	39	42	45

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the flow through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up:

	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
Total divisions	43	50	64

* These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type.

23. BUILD-UP (DIVS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA (SEE APPENDIX "A")

	1 Oct <u>1943</u>	1 Jan <u>1944</u>	1 Apr <u>1944</u>	1 Jul <u>1944</u>	1 Oct <u>1944</u>	1 Jan <u>1945</u>
U. S.	6	8	10	18	24	27
British	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	16	22	34	43	49	52

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the UNITED KINGDOM.

24. The second method of build-up, from the UNITED STATES and NORTH AFRICA is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be found in the MEDITERRANEAN that are not only composed of veterans, but that have also participated in large scale amphibious operations.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT

25. Appendix "B" lists the amphibious assault craft which will be available after HUSKY, and also after each of two major amphibious operations subsequent to HUSKY, if such operations are conducted.

GARRISONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

26. Proposed garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN are contained in Appendix "C."

EFFECT OF OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO HUSKY
ON ROUNDUP AND SICKLE

GROUND FORCES

27. If major operations, other than by air are undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN after the successful completion of HUSKY, no ground forces may be released for BOLERO until after the collapse of ITALY.

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28. Such operations may interfere seriously with *ROUNDUP* if shipping available for *BOLERO* has to be diverted to reinforce and support the forces engaged in the *MEDITERRANEAN*.

29. The time required to gain the objective of the *MEDITERRANEAN* operations--the collapse of *ITALY*--is indefinite. Success cannot be expected before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains to move two divisions from the *MEDITERRANEAN* to the *UNITED KINGDOM* before the target date selected for *ROUNDUP*, but there can be no assurance that shipping will be available. *ROUNDUP* would probably be deprived, therefore, of battle-experienced troops.

30. Little would be gained in the build-up following *ROUNDUP* by moving any other available forces from the *MEDITERRANEAN* to the *UNITED KINGDOM* over the movement of similar numbers from the *UNITED STATES*.

AIR FORCES

31. After providing for an air offensive against *ITALY*, convoy protection, and defense, about 900 combat aircraft and 250 transports will be available and could be moved to the *UNITED KINGDOM* following the completion of *HUSKY*. However, if further advances are undertaken, all aircraft employed at the time of *HUSKY* will remain in the *MEDITERRANEAN* until offensive operations are completed. All of the fighters (550), most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift two parachute regiments simultaneously, would be retained in the *MEDITERRANEAN* for garrison and supply of additionally occupied areas. Only light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 350) could be released for transfer to the *UNITED KINGDOM*.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT (SEE APPENDIX "B")

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to *HUSKY*, the number of amphibious assault craft available for *ROUNDUP* will total 4,657 of all types.

33. After one major amphibious operation subsequent to *HUSKY*, the total will be reduced to 3,540, or 76 percent of the maximum.

34. A second major amphibious operation subsequent to *HUSKY* will reduce the total to 2,461 or 53 percent of the total.

35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in the *UNITED KINGDOM* until about 1 March 1944.

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after *HUSKY* will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large scale *ROUNDUP*. It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would be entirely inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

37. After *HUSKY*, the main effort of the *UNITED NATIONS* should be concentrated on executing *SICKLE*, the bomber offensive, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

38. The planning date for *ROUNDUP* should be 1 April 1944.

39. The launching of a *ROUNDUP* operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of *UNITED STATES* and British resources to the *UNITED KINGDOM*, therefore, should be executed.

40. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* subsequent to *HUSKY* should be limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use resources vital to *ROUNDUP* and present the risk of a limitless commitment of *UNITED NATIONS* resources to the *MEDITERRANEAN* vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war.

APPENDIX "A"

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

1. The build-up in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for cross-Channel operations can be accomplished by two methods:

- a. The movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* only.
- b. The movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* and the transfer of all excess U. S. and British units from *NORTH AFRICA*.