Victoria Sorhegui | 2020 Summer Fellow - American Grand Strategy

Week 11: Final Reflection

This past summer as a remote research intern at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis I was able to dive into several issues related to foreign policy and national security. While it wasn’t my initial plan for the summer, this research opportunity at a prominent think tank in D.C. gave me the opportunity to expand my network and also explore a side of national security that I hadn’t really considered previously. I had always imagined myself working directly in the world of government, but this summer showed me how interesting the world of national security research can truly be. I’m also extremely excited to share with the AGS community that I will be continuing my remote research work for the Hudson Institute throughout the fall semester.

Throughout the summer, I researched several topics including Iranian nuclear safeguards concerns, hypersonic missile defense proposals, nuclear arms control agreements, Biden’s domestic policy platform, the new Defense Space Strategy, and several state department papers related to arms control. I came into this internship knowing about my interest in nuclear weapons and arms control, specifically in the Middle East, and after three months I found a new personal interest in the Space Force and new developments that are currently emerging in the space realm.

Despite all the craziness that consumed the past six months in the world, I’m so grateful for the AGS Program and Mr. Lehrman and his family for their constant support of my academic endeavors and goals. Since my freshman year at Duke, AGS has provided me with so many opportunities to grow and find success in the realm of national security. I feel so lucky to have found such a formative and supportive community of students and mentors that have shown me how fascinating this field of study truly is.

Week 10: Defense Space Strategy
July 19 through August 7, 2020

According to the new Defense Space Strategy (DSS) that was published on June 17, 2020, space has become a distinct warfighting domain and new strategic environment that demands new expertise and space-based capabilities. Space is a unique domain of national military power and is increasingly becoming a potential target at all levels of conflict. China and Russia currently present the greatest strategic threat due to their intentions and advancements in space in recent years. The reemergence of great power competition and extension of this into the space domain present enduring threats to the ability of the DoD to achieve its desired conditions in space.

The DSS provides guidance to the DoD on how to best achieve desired conditions in space in the next 10 years. The DoD desires a secure, stable, and accessible space domain, which will be sustained by U.S. military strength. The main objectives include: (1) maintain space superiority; (2) provide space support to national, joint, and combined operations; and (3) ensure space stability.

China and Russia are the most immediate and serious threats to the space domain. Both countries have analyzed U.S. dependencies in space and have developed doctrine and capabilities designed to deny U.S. access to and operations within the space domain. Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they understand the importance of space to modern warfare and consider the use of counterspace capabilities as a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness for winning future wars. Threats from North Korea and Iran in the space domain are also currently growing.

The DSS describes a new strategic approach in which the DoD will grow its space capacity throughout the next decade to ensure space superiority and secure U.S. vital interests. The DoD will do so in close cooperation with allies, partners, and industry—the DoD is striving to expand space partnerships to establish new pathways to collaborate. In order for this to be successful, we must embrace space as a unique domain of national and military power, as well as the principles of joint warfare.

The messaging of the DSS indicates that the DoD is embarking on the most significant transformation in the history of the U.S. national security space program. This new outlook on space as a war-fighting domain, and efforts to bolster the new U.S. Space Force and USSPACECOM, reflect the changing strategic environment and great power competition. Both China and Russia have made advances that identify space as a war-fighting domain, and the U.S. must continue to implement department-wide changes to defense policy, strategy, operations, capabilities, investments, and expertise to best respond to this evolving strategic environment. The Space Force will lead the U.S. in creating a cohesive posture among the defense community to best respond to growing threats in space and best integrate the space domain into existing policy and norms.

Week 9: An Overview of Biden’s Domestic Platform
July 13 through July 19, 2020

This week I took my research in a new direction and focused on domestic politics. Specifically, I looked into Joe Biden’s presidential platform and where we’ll see large shifts domestically if he wins the election in November.

Joe Biden’s domestic platform proposes a number of changes from the status quo of the Trump administration. This includes changes relating to the economy, health care, education, climate, and immigration. Much of President Trump’s 2020 campaign platform is the status quo or has not changed from his 2016 platform.

Economy

Vice President Biden’s economic plan includes five key points:
1. Tax wages and capital at the same rate
2. Increase taxes on the wealthiest Americans by limiting unequal and unproductive tax expenditures
3. Increase corporate tax rates
4. Increase estate taxes back to norm
5. Expand child and dependent care tax credit
Biden’s “Build Back Better” initiative aims to create five million additional American jobs. This will be achieved through the revival and reinvestment in American manufacturing, plans to leverage trade, tax and investment policy to spur domestic innovation, and reduce our reliance on foreign manufacturing.
A Biden-Sanders “Unity Task Force” was published describing proposals that include a New Deal-style federal jobs program to use government money to put Americans to work on infrastructure and other projects.
Biden’s new tax plan will likely get rid of the bulk of Trump’s $2 trillion tax cut.

Health Care

Vice President Biden holds a health care platform that focuses primarily on these five goals:
1. Lower Medicare to age 60 (currently at 65)
2. Install government-run public option
3. Boost the Affordable Care Act
4. Stop surprise billing
5. Prescription Drug Reform
Vice President Biden has voiced concern over the costs of “Medicare for All” and universal health care plans. Instead, his insurance plan is estimated to cover 97% of Americans.

Education

Relating to higher education, Biden is committed to making two years of community college tuition-free, using Pell Grants to cover living costs, for all Americans. He is also committed to making public four-year colleges tuition-free for families earning up to $125,000 annually.
There are five main points of Biden’s K-12 education plan (estimated to cost $850 billion over 10 years):
1. Triple Title I funding for public schools, with some of the funds going to increase teacher salaries
2. Fully fund the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), roughly tripling current levels of funding, phased in over a decade
3. Provide universal pre-kindergarten to all three- and four-year-olds
4. Improve public school buildings as part of infrastructure legislation
5. Provide opportunities for teachers to serve as mentors and coaches to other educators while being compensated for the additional work

Immigration

Vice President Biden’s immigration platform will make many changes to President Trump’s current “get tough” border policies. This unity platform was developed by Vice President Biden and Senator Bernie Sanders and aims to wipe clean many of the Trump administration’s immigration policies that have been implemented the past three years. His main points include:
1. Grant citizenship rights to 11 million illegal immigrants.
2. Plans to expand sanctuary locations.
3. Limit ICE’s ability to deport criminals in local jails.
4. Reverse deportations for some military veterans already ousted because of criminal records.
5. Immediate 100-day halt of deportations.
6. Implement more oversight over ICE officers

These main points on immigration clearly show Biden’s effort to unwind and revamp the Trump’s policies and the immigration system currently in place.

Climate

Vice President Biden has created a number of proposals designed to create economic opportunities and strengthen infrastructure while also tackling climate change. This plan involves a mix of executive action and congressional legislation.
1. He plans to spend $2 trillion over four years to significantly escalate the use of clean energy in the transportation, electricity, and building sectors.
2. Wants to put Americans into electric vehicles and zero-emissions mass transit, and rebuild roads, bridges and other infrastructure.
3. He wants to achieve an emissions-free power sector by 2035 and upgrade four million buildings to meet the highest standards for energy efficiency.
4. Set a goal for disadvantaged communities to receive 40% of all clean energy and infrastructure benefits.

To pay for this plan, Biden has proposed an increase in corporate income tax from 21% to 28% as well as stimulus spending. Income-tax will also be raised from 37% to 39.6% for those making over $400,000 a year.

Weeks 7 and 8: New Defense Space Strategy and the U.S. Space Force
June 29, 2020 through July 12, 2020

I spent the last two weeks researching and putting together a memo on the new Defense Space Strategy and how the U.S. Space Force will implement the goals of this strategy.

According to the new Defense Space Strategy (DSS) that was published on June 17, 2020, space has become a distinct war-fighting domain and new strategic environment that demands new expertise and space-based capabilities. Space is a unique domain of national military power and is increasingly becoming a potential target at all levels of conflict. China and Russia currently present the greatest strategic threat due to their intentions and advancements in space in recent years. The reemergence of great power competition and extension of this into the space domain present enduring threats to the ability of the DoD to achieve its desired conditions in space.

The new DSS provides guidance to the DoD on how to best achieve desired conditions in space in the next 10 years. The DoD desires a secure, stable, and accessible space domain, which will be sustained by U.S. military strength. The main objectives include: (1) maintain space superiority; (2) provide space support to national, joint, and combined operations; and (3) ensure space stability.

Threats, Challenges, Opportunities

China and Russia are the most immediate and serious threats to the space domain. Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they understand the importance of space to modern warfare and consider the use of counter-space capabilities as a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness for winning future wars.

While the DoD is making serious efforts to better equip our military programs for future conflict in space, there are a number of challenges that may limit the department’s ability to achieve its desired space conditions. These challenges include: (1) limited prior DoD operational experience with conflict extending into space; (2) the nonexistence of international agreements of what is considered unsafe, irresponsible, or threatening behavior in space; (3) increased exposure of U.S. activities by advances in potential adversary and commercial space-based capabilities, impeding the U.S. military’s freedom of action in all domains; and (4) uncertain public understanding of U.S. reliance on space systems.

The emerging strategic environment in the space domain presents opportunities that may enhance the DoD’s ability to attain desired conditions in space. These opportunities include: (1) space remains a top national priority with increasing resources to ensure continued U.S. leadership; (2) creation of new space-focused organization in the DoD offers opportunity to reform aspects of defense space enterprise; (3) new leadership and management for the space domain will synchronize the DoD’s space development efforts; (4) U.S. trusting relationships with allies promotes collaborating efforts in the development of space capabilities; and (5) the DoD has the opportunity to leverage innovation and cost-effective investments driven by the private sector. The DoD established the U.S. Space Force (USSF), USSSPACECOM, and Space Development Agency (SDA) under the Air Force to institutionalize the commitment of the U.S. government to champion strategic change across the national security space enterprise.

Strategic Approach

The DoD will pursue four lines of effort to best achieve its desired space conditions and respond to threats and challenges in the space domain. These lines of effort include: (1) build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate military space power into national, joint, and combined operations; (3) shape the strategic environment through promoting norms of behavior in space that are favorable to the U.S. and allied interests; and (4) cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and other U.S. government departments and agencies to best design a cohesive space approach.

Moving Forward

Although uncertain, the U.S. Space Force will likely lead the new space program in organizing, training, and equipping space forces to protect U.S. and allied interests in the space domain. It is the goal of the Space Force to maintain and enhance their competitive edge while adapting to new strategic challenges. It will be the job of the Space Force to revise military doctrine for space power and develop a team of professionals to best lead our endeavors in the space domain.

Week 6: Memo Writing on U.S. Hypersonic Missile Defense Proposals
June 22, 2020 through June 29, 2020

This week I had the opportunity to write a memo summarizing different U.S. Hypersonic Missile Defense System Proposals for an ongoing Hudson Institute project. Through my research I found a few main points that guided my writing; First, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are exploring multiple hypersonic missile defense programs to counter Russian and Chinese offensive hypersonic missile programs. The three largest systems developing prototypes include DARPA’s Glide Breaker program as well as the MDA’s Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System (RGPWS) and Hypersonic Defense Weapon System (HDWS)—the Space Development Agency (SDA) is also heavily involved. Lastly, there is very little public evidence of Russian and Chinese efforts at developing hypersonic missile defense programs.

Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are designed to exploit gaps within our current missile defense structure. The MDA’s collection of satellite sensors, sea and terrestrial radars, and ground-based interceptors are designed for a singular threat. Ballistic flight paths are relatively predictable; however, an HGV flies an unpredictable path and has the energy to maneuver aggressively during flight. HGV’s also travel at such high velocities and low altitudes that current systems don’t have a realistic chance to successfully intercept these vehicles. These features of HGVs render point-defense systems like the Patriot and THAAD, essentially ineffective. It is for this reason that the MDA and DARPA have embarked on numerous programs, beginning in 2017, to defend against Russia’s and China’s growing hypersonic weapons capabilities.

Beginning next year, in 2021, the SDA, MDA, and DARPA will begin launching satellites into orbit that have the capability of targeting hypersonic missiles as they maneuver in the atmosphere, through the MDA’s Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) system. The SDA plans to launch numerous satellites into a low-orbit space constellation with a wide-field-of-view infrared sensor to better detect HGVs. The SDA is currently seeking industry solutions for their Tracking Phenomenology Experiment (TPE) and is requesting proposals for the new satellite technology through July 2020. Following the activation of the new satellites, the MDA can go forward with plans to implement the RGPWS program. Although details of the above-listed systems remain classified, it is possible that the DARPA Glide Breaker system may also be utilized.

While Russia and China are making serious strides in their offensive hypersonic missiles capabilities, there is little to no public evidence of hypersonic defense systems at the current moment. Both Russia and China have prioritized the development and testing of hypersonic weapons technology the past few years so have an advantage in the field. Russia successfully tested the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle in December, 2019, with the assumption that it is invulnerable to intercept by an existing or prospective missile defense system of potential adversaries. Similarly, China is in the testing phase and has supposedly conducted more HGV tests in the past year than the U.S. has in the past decade, according to Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Mike Griffin.

If you’re interested in reading more about hypersonic missile defense, stay tuned for upcoming articles from the Hudson Institute. CSIS also has done extensive research on the matter!

Week 5: My First Presentation at the Hudson Institute
June 14, 2020 through June 21, 2020

For the first time this past week, the interns in my office at the Hudson Institute had the opportunity to present some of the projects we have been working on to our team. I chose to present on ACIS Paper #5, which I wrote about in my blog last week, and discussed Iran’s recent nuclear safeguards concerns and U.S. policy to address these concerns. This was an incredible opportunity as I got to see and talk to my colleagues for the first time in our remote, “work from home” environment. It was also fun to practice my presentation skills and share research that I find incredibly fascinating.

Some of the other interns shared their thoughts on a number of other ACIS papers from Chinese and Russian great power competition to information about Huawei. It was cool to hear from these students and how the papers related to previous internships and jobs they’ve held in the past and was equally interesting to participate in facilitated conversations about how the 2020 election might affect the future of many of these issues, especially issues with Iran and their nuclear safeguards compliance with the IAEA.

This week, I also began new research on U.S. proposals for hypersonic missile defense. I started reading and collecting articles that explained what these systems will look like, their necessity in this new “arms race” of hypersonic weapons, and how the DOD is going about working with the private sector to design and produce prototypes. Next week I’ll dive a little deeper into the different systems that are being considered and our competition with Russia and China on these defense systems.

Week 4: ACIS Paper #5: Iranian Nuclear Safeguards Concerns and U.S. Policy to Address Them
June 7, 2020 through June 14, 2020

This week at the Hudson Institute, I summarized and analyzed two final papers in the State Department’s Arms Control and International Security paper series as my project for the week. I looked at paper five, which discussed new evidence of Iranian nuclear safeguards concerns and U.S. policy to address such concerns, as well as paper eight, which discussed national security export controls recently placed on Huawei and why.

I found paper five the most interesting as I have tried to focus my studies around nuclear issues, specifically relating to Iran. The ACIS paper identifies a number of new incidents and evidence that Iran has been noncompliant with the IAEA and its safeguards obligations. The IAEA holds an extremely vital role in monitoring nuclear activities globally and ensuring that nuclear technology is not being used for weapons work. The paper emphasizes that any sign of noncompliance should be seen as a threat to the safeguards system everywhere, especially coming from a country with a historic pattern of deception and obstruction relating to its nuclear weapons program.

The paper focused less on the JCPOA, and more on instances of noncompliance that have emerged in the years prior to the JCPOA as well as more recently that truly test the integrity of the global nuclear safeguards system. In early 2018, Israel discovered Iran’s “nuclear archive” of documents and data from Iran’s former nuclear weapons program in Tehran. Moreover, Iran not only holds its weapons program records, but has also retained many of its scientists that previously worked in the weapons program, and they now work on nuclear weapon-relevant-dual-use technical activities. These scientists are working under the leadership of the same official who formerly ran Iran’s weapons program. More recently, in August 2019 we heard the first public reports that the IAEA was seeking cooperation from Iran on matters related to their CSA and AP. In November 2019, the international community learned that the IAEA had detected uranium particles of anthropogenic origin, at an undeclared location in Iran, which is in violation of their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Allegations and concerns about Iran’s possible secret activities and hidden equipment at this site are assumed to have begun in late 2018.

In almost two years, Iran has failed to comply with the IAEA about these concerns and hasn’t answered any questions about the activities that occurred at the undeclared site, the origin of the particles, or the whereabouts of any contaminated items that may have been the source of the particles. Iran’s failure to cooperate has made it impossible for the IAEA to assess how much nuclear material was at that site and is currently unaccounted for. Unexplained evidence of chemically processed uranium is a central concern of the safeguards system possibly violating Article II and Article III of the NPT. A lack of transparency also perpetuates huge proliferation risks.

Although debates about the JCPOA have taken up much of the noise surrounding Iran’s nuclear program in recent months, Dr. Christopher Ford believes that this new evidence proves extremely concerning for the future of the nuclear safeguards system and the integrity of the IAEA. Iran’s failure to cooperate and give the IAEA access to its facilities, although the IAEA is legally entitled to do so, violates the NPT and its Additional Protocol. Iran’s failed compliance for months without repercussions also sets an extremely dangerous precedent for other states with safeguards obligations. These safeguards issues demonstrate that important questions still remain about what nuclear materials, equipment, and information from Iran’s past illegal weapons program remain hidden and might still exist.

The future of U.S. policy with Iran remains uncertain and mostly dependent upon Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. The United States currently remains willing to offer Iran full normalization of diplomatic relations including the exchange of ambassadors and full sanctions relief as long as Iran cooperates and is transparent with the IAEA regarding its nuclear activities. It must also allow the U.S. to impose enduring constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, this likely means restraints on their uranium enrichment activities. The U.S. must also consider Iran’s ability to be a good-faith negotiating partner following of years deception.

The international community must also work to support the IAEA if Iran continues to refuse answering questions about nuclear activities or providing access to sites. According to the paper, the international community must impose international sanctions if cooperation isn’t established. And while this may be politically inconvenient for defenders of the JCPOA, the State Department does not believe that we can ignore the growing safeguards concerns and problems for much longer, especially if we are to create a new deal in the coming years. The international community must insist that Iran cooperate fully and completely with the IAEA in order to resolve our concerns and preserve the possibility of a diplomatic and peaceful solution.

Week 3: Moving Back to Durham and the State Department’s ACIS Papers
June 1, 2020 through June 7, 2020

I spent most of this past week moving my life from Florida back to Durham. While I have truly enjoyed my time at home since mid-March, reconnecting with my family and absorbing as much Florida sunshine and Vitamin D as possible, I thought it was time to head back to Durham and get into an everyday routine that wouldn’t be disrupted from a busy household. I’m finally all settled into my off-campus apartment that I’ll be living in with my best friend until I graduate next May, and I’ve been filled with this feeling that I’m ready to really complete my last year at Duke. I’ve never really felt this before (I’m usually telling myself I can’t imagine what life will be like after I leave Duke), and it’s a great feeling to be excited for what’s coming next in my life.

At the Hudson Institute this week, I was tasked to summarize a number of the State Department’s Arms Control and International Security (ACIS) papers. This series of papers is produced by the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and aims to offer insights into how the State Department plans on responding to arms control issues in the near future.

The first paper I summarized discussed U.S. priorities for next-generation arms control. Essentially, this paper identified the growing threats that both China and Russia pose in the nuclear realm and the efforts that must be made in order to curtail any future nuclear arsenal growth of these two superpowers. Through discussions of the New START Treaty, Russia’s growing non-strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia’s new strategic delivery systems that aren’t under the New START Treaty’s accountability framework, and China’s quickly growing dual-capable weapons systems, the paper clearly identifies growing threats and our necessity to pursue trilateral arms control negotiations.

I will be discussing the other two papers I summarized in my blog post next week—in the meantime I’ll be enjoying some chocolate mousse from Vin Rouge!

Week 2: A Reflection on Current Issues and a Look into Arms Control
May 25, 2020 through May 31, 2020

This past week has been incredibly heavy for our nation. I’ve tried to find the perfect words to describe how I feel regarding recent events and I’ve come to understand that there isn’t something perfect to say to describe my feelings right now. I have had an incredibly blessed and privileged life growing up and I will never understand how my black friends and peers feel every day in our country. The systemic inequality that has, yet again, resurfaced as a topic of discussion needs to see immediate change and must remain a part of our daily conversations until the system is fixed. It is our duty as privileged Americans to come together and support our peers, and not only fight for equality but also educate ourselves to become better allies. I have spent the week having conversations with my friends and family about these systemic problems and am actively seeking and compiling resources to teach myself about the daily struggles and inequalities many Americans face daily.

Amidst the chaos of our country for the past week, while I felt somewhat guilty at times for being able to spend countless hours doing research for my job, I looked into the New START Treaty and what the next few years in arms control might look like. Essentially, my project for the week included assessing what future US-Russian-Chinese arms control might look like in the coming years—and this includes the future of the New START Treaty, which was signed into place in the early years of the Obama administration. The treaty is up for extension in February 2021 so there is a lot of pressure right now on how the Trump administration will act and if they will choose to extend the current treaty, make changes, or let the treaty lapse. While many experts believe that extending the treaty is a no-brainer for the administration, Trump and his team are hesitant to extend without modifications and to also extend without including China, another global superpower. Adding China to arms control negotiations would level the playing field between the three powers and prevent a rise in China’s nuclear power while the US and Russia remain constrained under a bilateral treaty. The next few months will remain instrumental as the Trump administration works with Russia and China in trilateral arms control talks, as well as how this will affect the New START Treaty and the possibility of leaving the world without arms control for the first time in over four decades.

Week 1: A Glimpse into Transitioning to a Remote Internship
May 18, 2020 through May 24, 2020

This week I started my remote research internship with the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis from my home in Naples, FL. Because I’ve only had one week of work and don’t have too much to share yet regarding my research, I thought I would spend my first blog post discussing my remote experience thus far in comparison to my experience working on Capitol Hill last summer.

Working remotely is quite the shift from an in-person internship for many reasons, but for me the biggest shift has been working from home with my family rather than in DC surrounded and motivated by other interns. I can vividly remember walking around DC, immersed in history and the support of students, hearing the constant buzz about networking events and building relationships with coworkers. I remember feeling inspired by the interns who I worked with or those who I had met at events and my desire to learn from them as well as from my job on the Hill. Being in DC was more than just my internship itself—it also allowed me to immerse myself in American history, grow closer with other Duke students also in DC, and build relationships and learn from other students in the city as well. This summer, while I may have the beach a short 10-minute drive from my home and the recent re-opening of my favorite coffee shop to help keep me motivated (at least for the next two weeks before I head back up to Durham), it’s definitely not the same feeling.

Because my internship experience will be quite different from last year, not only because we’re remote but also because I’m shifting into a research position, I decided to journal a couple goals for the summer and what I hope to gain from my internship despite the changes that all interns are adapting to in the chaos of COVID-19. After writing for a bit I came out with two main goals that I hope to achieve this summer:

First, I hope to take advantage of my free time this summer. While I will be doing research for the Hudson Institute, I’ll also find that I have much more time on my hands to focus on developing new skills. Through my editing of the AGS Through Film final project I have come to enjoy film editing and could see myself becoming well versed in Adobe Premier Pro and other related programs.
Second, I’m hoping to really engage with the Hudson Institute and the projects I’m working on throughout the summer. I want to go into my senior year at Duke having really learned about numerous topics related to political-military affairs and take this knowledge into my senior year and my search for full-time jobs or graduate programs. I spent my first week at Hudson reading about Russian and Chinese disinformation campaign tactics and goals—a topic I had only glanced at previously.

I look forward to sharing my research experiences each week!